James Madison (March 5, 1731 - June 28, 1836). Madison was born in Virginia; his father was a prominent, slaveowning planter; his mother came from an equally wealthy and respected family. He attended boarding school, was tutored at home - a common practice among theJames Madison Virginia gentry- and then attended the College of New Jersey (Princeton) - also a common practice for the sons of Virginia planters - in 1769. His Virginia teachers, his family, and the faculty at Princeton, especially its president, John Witherspoon, were all outspoken opponents during the 1760s of British imperial regulation-good Whigs*--and Madison came to political maturity in this atmosphere.

    After graduating from the College of New Jersey, he returned to the family plantation, and when Virginians began organizing resistance to the British program to coerce the colonies into submission, both father and son joined the local Committee of Safety. But his most notable achievement in this period was not a stand for political freedom, but for religious liberty. A devout Christian, Madison believed in the principle of religious liberty, and in 1774, he made his first political statement by denouncing the jailing of an unlicensed Baptist preacher. (In Virginia the Anglican church was "established," meaning that it and it alone had the right to collect taxes for the support of the ministry; other protestant denominations had to be licensed before they could legally preach, and most refused to seek or were denied licenses.). Madison was subsequently elected to the state convention of 1776, which drafted the famous Virginia constitution of that year, and it was Madison who successfully argued that the Declaration of Rights should grant not religious "toleration" but religious "freedom." Madison would in subsequent years work with Thomas Jefferson to give statutory protection to religious freedom and to disestablish the Anglican Church in Virginia. He would also draft the amendments to the U.S. Constitution that became the Bill of Rights.

During the Revolutionary War, his health too fragile to allow him to join the military, Madison served on the Virginia Council of State, and was then elected to the Continental Congress. He demonstrated a mastery of legislative politics, and helped persuade Virginia to cede its land claims in the "Old Northwest" (the Ohio River Valley) to confederated government - a key step in persuading other states to ratify the Articles of Confederation (the first agreement creating a unified, independent nation in America). Madison retired from the Congress in 1783 fully aware of the weaknesses of the national government and as a strong supporter of plans (never successful) to strengthen the government by granting it the power to tax trade and raise revenue in other ways independent of the states (the revolutionary government could only raise revenues through loans and requests to the states).

By 1786, Madison had serious concern about the survival of the Union. The several states seemed unable to coordinate policy on trade and foreign affairs, and the central government still lacked means to raise the revenues necessary to pay the wartime debt. He helped organize the Annapolis Convention, where it was agreed to call for a national convention to consider revisions to the Articles of Confederation, and he played a key role in convincing Virginia to support the 1787 convention in Philadelphia. By 1786 Madison had become convinced, however, that amending the Articles was not enough. A new form of government was needed. The individual states, left free to regulate their own affairs, seemed to follow the irrational passions of legislative majorities. The tyranny of the majority now threatened individual rights, just as much as British tyranny had earlier threatened American rights. Madison considered paper money laws (that allowed debts, contacted in hard money, to be paid in deflated paper money) and "stay laws" (that gave debtors extensions of time to pay off debts before their creditors could seize their property or have them jailed) as evidence of an assault on individual (property) rights. He equated such attacks with attacks on religious freedom, and understood both as evidence of tyranny. He was particularly alarmed Shay's Rebellion - the armed resistance by Massachusetts farmers to attempts to collect debts from them. Only a stronger national government, he felt, could check the anarchy occurring in the states and save the Union.

Madison played a key role at the Philadelphia Convention. He wrote (Edmund Randolph introduced) the "Virginia Plan" for a new, far stronger form of national government; he was a consistent advocate for representation throughout the Constitution based on population (the "large state" position), of expanded powers for the national government, and of controls on state government. Once the Convention approved the Constitution, Madison joined with John Jay and Alexander Hamilton, both of New York, to pen the most famous defense of the document during the ratification debates, The Federalist Papers. Madison's Tenth Federalist contained many of the arguments that Madison had made at the Convention, and it still considered one of the most important reflections on the principles of governance in the United States.

Madison won election to the new House of Representatives, where he quickly became the floor leader in the First Federal Congress. It was in this role that he drafted the constitutional amendments that became the Bill of Rights.

Madison subsequent career can be briefly summarized: he gradually drifted into opposition to policies of the new administration, and along with Thomas Jefferson helped organize a "Republican" opposition to the "Federalist" government of Hamilton and Washington. While he left the House in 1797, he and Jefferson (who had also left his post in the administration) drafted the "Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions" to oppose the Adams' administration Alien and Sedition Acts. When Jefferson won the Presidency in the 1800 election, Madison became his Secretary of State, and he succeeded Jefferson as President in his own right in 1809. During his presidency, Madison led America into war with Great Britain (1812-1814) and sponsored the chartering of the Second Bank of the United States (that would become so controversial during Andrew Jackson's administration). He died in 1836.

James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, New York, 24 October, 1 November 1787

Excerpts from a Letter

Note: in the section below, Madison explains why he felt that the National Government needed a “Negative” on the laws of the States.  Madison had proposed and defend the National Negative at Philadelphia, but had lost on the issue.

Source:  SOURCE: John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, eds.,  THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, Volume XIII: Commentaries on the Constitution: Public and Private, Volume 1: 21 February to 7 November 1787 (Madison, Wisconsin, 1981),  444-449.

The second object, the due partition of power, between the General & local Governments, was perhaps of all, the most nice and difficult. A few contended for an entire abolition of the States; some for indefinite power of Legislation in the Congress, with a negative on the laws of the States: some for such a power without a negative; some for a limited power of legislation, with such a negative; the majority finally for a lim­ited power without the negative. The question with regard to the Nega­tive underwent repeated discussions, and was finally rejected by a bare majority. As I formerly intimated to you my opinion in favor of this in­gredient, I will take this occasion of explaining myself on the subject.  Such a check on the States appears to me necessary 1. to prevent en­croachments on the General authority. 2. to prevent instability and in­justice in the legislation of the States.

        1. Without such a check in the whole over the parts, our system in­volves the evil of imperia in imperio. If a compleat supremacy some where is not necessary in every Society, a controuling power at least is so, by which the general authority may be defended against encroach­ments of the subordinate authorities, and by which the latter may be re­strained from encroachments on each other. If the supremacy of the British Parliament is not necessary as has been contended, for the har­mony of that Empire; it is evident I think that without the royal nega­tive or some equivalent controul, the unity of the system would be de­stroyed. The want of some such provision seems to have been mortal to the antient Confederacies, and to be the disease of the modern. Of the Lycian Confederacy little is known. That of the Amphyctions is well known to have been rendered of little use whilst it lasted, and in the end to have been destroyed by the predominance of the local over the federal authority. The same observation may be made, on the authority of Polybius, with regard to the Achaean League. The Helvetic System scarcely amounts to a Confederacy, and is distinguished by too many peculiarities to be a ground of comparison. The case of the United Netherlands is in point. The authority of a Statholder, the influence of a Standing army, the common interest in the conquered possessions, the pressure of surrounding danger, the guarantee of foreign powers, are not sufficient to secure the authority and interests of the generality, agst. the antifederal tendency of the provincial sovereignties. The Ger­man Empire is another example. A Heriditary chief with vast indepen­dent resources of wealth and power, a federal Diet, with ample parch­ment authority, a regular judiciary establishment, the influence of the neighbourhood of great & formidable Nations, have been found un­able either to maintain the subordination of the members, or to prevent their mutual contests & encroachments. Still more to the purpose is our own experience both during the war and since the peace. Encroach­ments of the States on the general authority, sacrifices of national to lo­cal interests, interferences of the measures of different States, form a great part of the history of our political system.‑It may be said that the new Constitution is founded on different principles; and will have a different operation. I admit the difference to be material. It presents the aspect rather of a feudal system of republics, if such a phrase may be used; than of a Confederacy, of independent States. And what has been the progress and event of the feudal Constitutions? In all of them a continual struggle between the head and the inferior members, until a final victory has been gained in some instances by one, in others, by the other of them. In one respect indeed there is a remarkable variance between the two cases. In the feudal system the sovereign, though lim­ited, was independent; and having no particular sympathy of interests with the great Barons, his ambition had as full play as theirs in the mu­tual projects of usurpation. In the American Constitution The general authority will be derived entirely from the subordinate authorities. The Senate will represent the States in their political capacity; the other House will represent the people of the States in their individual capacy. The former will be accountable to their Constituents at moderate, the latter at short periods. The President also derives his appointment from the States, and is periodically accountable to them. This depen­dence of the General, on the local authorities, seems effectually to guard the latter against any dangerous encroachments of the former: Whilst the latter, within their respective limits, will be continually sensi­ble of the abridgment of their power, and be stimulated by ambition to resume the surrendered portion of it. We find the representatives of Counties and corporations in the Legislatures of the States, much more disposed to sacrifice the aggregate interest, and even authority, to the local views of their Constituents, than the latter to the former. I mean not by these remarks to insinuate that an esprit de corps will not exist in the national Government or that opportunities may not occur, of ex­tending its jurisdiction in some points. I mean only that the danger of encroachments is much greater from the other side, and that the im­possibility of dividing powers of legislation, in such a manner, as to be free from different constructions by different interests, or even from ambiguity in the judgment of the impartial, requires some such expe­dient as I contend for. Many illustrations might be given of this impos­sibility. How long has it taken to fix, and how imperfectly is yet fixed the legislative power of corporations, though that power is subordinate in the most compleat manner? The line of distinction between the power of regulating trade and that of drawing revenue from it, which was once considered as the barrier of our liberties, was found on fair discussion, to be absolutely undefinable. No distinction seems to be more obvious than that between spiritual and temporal matters. Yet wherever they have been made objects of Legislation, they have clashed and contended with each other, till one or the other has gained the su­premacy. Even the boundaries between the Executive, Legislative & Ju­diciary powers, though in general so strongly marked in themselves, consist in many instances of mere shades of difference. It may be said that the judicial, authority under our new system will keep the States within their proper limits, and supply the place of a negative on their laws. The answer is, that it is more convenient to prevent the passage of a law, than to declare it void after it is passed; that this will be particu­larly the case, where the law aggrieves individuals, who may be unable to support an appeal agst. a State to the supreme judiciary; that a State which would violate the Legislative rights of the Union, would not be very ready to obey a judicial decree in support of them, and that a re­currence to force, which in the event of disobedience would be neces­sary, is an evil which the new Constitution meant to exclude as far as possible.

2. A constitutional negative on the laws of the States seems equally necessary to secure individuals agst. encroachments on their rights. The mutability of the laws of the States is found to be a serious evil. The injustice of them has been so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm the most stedfast friends of Republicanism. I am persuaded I do not err in saying that the evils issuing from these sources contributed more to that uneasiness which produced the Convention, and prepared the public mind for a general reform, than those which accrued to our national character and interest from the inadequacy of the Confederation to its immediate objects. A reform therefore which does not make provision for private rights, must be materially defective. The restraints agst. pa­per emissions, and violations of contracts are not sufficient. Supposing them to be effectual as far as they go, they are short of the mark. Injus­tice may be effected by such an infinitude of legislative expedients, that where the disposition exists it can only be controuled by some provision which reaches all cases whatsoever. The partial provision made, sup­poses the disposition which will evade it. It may be asked how private rights will be more secure under the Guardianship of the General Gov­ernment than under the State Governments, since they are both founded'on the republican principle which refers the ultimate decision to the will of the majority, and are distinguished rather by the extent within which they will operate, than by any material difference in their structure. A full discussion of this question would, if I mistake not, un­fold the true principles of Republican Government, and prove in con­trediction to the concurrent opinions of theoretical writers, that this form of Government, in order to effect its purposes, must operate not within a small but an extensive sphere. I will state some of the ideas which have occurred to me on this subject. Those who contend for a simple Democracy, or a pure republic, actuated by the sense of the ma­jority, and operating within narrow limits, assume or suppose a case which is altogether fictitious. They found their reasoning on the idea, that the people composing the Society, enjoy not only an equality of po­litical rights; but that they have all precisely the same interests, and the same feelings in every respect. Were this in reality the case, their rea­soning would be conclusive. The interest of the majority would be that of the minority also; the decisions could only turn on mere opinion con­cerning the good of the whole, of which the major voice would be the safest criterion; and within a small sphere, this voice could be most eas­ily collected, and the public affairs most accurately managed. We know however that no Society ever did or can consist of so homogeneous a mass of Citizens. In the savage State indeed, an approach is made to­wards it; but in that State little or no Government is necessary. In all civilized Societies, distinctions are various and unavoidable. A distinc­tion of property results from that very protection which a free Govern­ment gives to unequal faculties of acquiring it. There will be rich and poor; creditors and debtors; a landed interest, a monied interest, a mercantile interest, a manufacturing interest. These classes may again be subdivided according to the different productions of different situa­tions & soils, & according to different branches of commerce, and of manufactures. In addition to these natural distinctions, artificial ones will be founded, on accidental differences in political, religious or other opinions, or an attachment to the persons of leading individuals. How­ever erroneous or ridiculous these grounds of dissention and faction, may appear to the enlightened Statesman, or the benevolent philoso­pher, the bulk of mankind who are neither Statesmen nor Philoso­phers, will continue to view them in a different light. It remains then to be enquired whether a majority having any common interest, or feeling any common passion, will find sufficient motives to restrain them from oppressing the minority. An individual is never allowed to be a judge or even a witness in his own cause. If two individuals are under the biass of interest or enmity agst. a third, the rights of the latter could never be safely referred to the majority of the three. Will two thousand individ­uals be less apt to oppress one thousand, or two hundred thousand, one hundred thousand? Three motives only can restrain in such cases. 1. a prudent regard to private or partial good, as essentially involved in the general and permanent good of the whole. This ought no doubt to be sufficient of itself. Experience however shews that it has little effect on individuals, and perhaps still less on a collection of individuals; and least of all on a majority with the public authority in their hands. If the former are ready to forget that honesty is the best‑ policy; the last do more. They often proceed on the converse of the maxim: that whatever is politic is honest. 2. respect for character. This motive is not found sufficient to restrain individuals from injustice, and loses its efficacy in proportion to the number which is to divide the praise or the blame. Besides as it has reference to public opinion, which is that of the major­ity, the Standard is fixed by those whose conduct is to be measured by it. 3. Religion. The inefficacy of this restraint on individuals is well known. The conduct of every popular Assembly, acting on oath, the strongest of religious ties, shews that individuals join without remorse in acts agst. which their consciences would revolt, if proposed to them separately in their closets. When Indeed Religion is kindled into enthu­siasm, its force like that of other passions is increased by the sympathy of a multitude. But enthusiasm is only a temporary state of Religion, and whilst it lasts will hardly be seen with pleasure at the helm. Even in its coolest state, it has been much oftener a motive to oppression than a restraint from it. If then there must be different interests and parties in Society; and a majority when united by a common interest or passion can not be restrained from oppressing the minority, what remedy can be found in a republican Government, where the majority must ulti­mately decide, but that of giving such an extent to its sphere, that no common interest or passion will be likely to unite a majority of the whole number in an unjust pursuit. In a large Society, the people are broken into so many interests and parties, that a common sentiment is less likely to be felt, and the requisite concert less likely to be formed, by a majority of the whole. The same security seems requisite for the civil as for the religious rights of individuals. If the same sect form a major­ity and have the power, other sects will be sure to be depressed. Divide et impera, the reprobated axiom of tyranny, is under certain qualifications, the only policy, by which a republic can be administered on just principles. It must be observed however that this doctrine can only hold within a sphere of a mean extent. As in too small a sphere op­pressive combinations may be too easily formed agst. the weaker party; so in too extensive a one, a defensive concert may be rendered too difficult against the oppression of those entrusted with the administra­tion. The great desideratum in Government is, so to modify the sov­ereignty as that it may be sufficiently neutral between different parts of the Society to controul one part from invading the rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controuled itself, from setting up an interest adverse to that of the entire Society. In absolute monarchies, the Prince may be tolerably neutral towards different classes of his sub­jects; but may sacrifice the happiness of all to his personal ambition or avarice. In small republics, the sovereign will is controuled from such a sacrifice of the entire Society, but is not sufficiently neutral towards the parts composing it. In the extended Republic of the United States, The General Government would hold a pretty even balance between the parties of particular States, and be at the same time sufficiently re­strained by its dependence on the community, from betraying its general interests.


  Note: Picture from web site: http://www.virginia.edu:80/pjm/home.html  (The Papers of James Madison).