Fletcher v.
Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810). The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered
by Chief Justice John Marshall, used the contract clause of the Constitution
(Article I, Section 10) to protect individual property rights from state legislative
action. The case arose from conflicting
land claims to Georgia's Yazoo territory (modern Alabama and Mississippi). Georgia sold much of this land during the
1780s and early 1790s (despite the claim to the region of its Native American
inhabitants) to speculators, the largest sale coming in 1795 after bribes were
paid to the state legislature. After
the sale, Jeffersonian Republicans gained power, using the fraudulent land
sales as a campaign issue against the Federalists, and the state assembly
repealed the sale act.
John Peck, of Massachusetts, bought land that Georgia had previously
sold under the 1795 act; Peck then sold it to Robert Fletcher, of New
Hampshire, and in 1803 Fletcher brought a collusive suit against Peck in
federal court, claiming that Peck did not have clear title to the land he sold
to him. Their hope was to use the suit
to establish the legitimacy of titles under the 1795 act, and to use a court
ruling to get compensation from the federal government for their land. In 1807, the federal Circuit Court upheld
Peck's position, and Fletcher appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Marshall ruled in favor of Peck.
He held first that the Supreme Court was powerless to investigate the
motives of the Georgia legislature in making the 1795 sale, and in so doing
further clarified the distinction between political questions, left to other
branches of government and judicial questions, that the Court might properly
decide. Marshall then upheld Peck's
claims and voided the Georgia repeal act on two grounds, natural law and the
contract clause. Even in the absence of
specific constitutional protection, the very nature of government and society,
Marshall contended, kept a legislature from seizing property without
compensation. The state repeal act,
however, also impaired a contract obligation between the state and the original
purchasers in violation of Article I, Section 10 of the United State
Constitution.
Marshall ruled to protect and stimulate private economic
initiative. If, he argued, fraud
between two parties in the transfer of property could adversely affect the
rights of subsequent buyers and sellers of that property, then "[a]ll
titles would be insecure, and the intercourse between man and man would be
seriously obstructed...." More
generally, his opinion gave the federal courts a role, under the contract
clause, in reviewing state legislative regulation of private contract and
property rights. The contract clause
would continue to be used by the Supreme Court throughout the nineteenth
century to limit state regulatory power, and after the Civil War, the Court
often invoked the Clause, and cited Fletcher v. Peck, to protect
corporations from state laws and to block state reform efforts.
Sources: C. Peter
Magrath, Yazoo: Law and Politics in the New republic: The Case of Fletcher
v. Peck (1966).